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Alicia H. Munnell and Steven A. Sass
Social Security 
and the Stock Market 
Lessons from Around the World
This article is based on the authors’ book 
Social Security and the Stock Market: How 
the Pursuit of Market Magic Shapes the 
System, which is available now from the 
Upjohn Institute. See the form on the back 
cover for details. 
The U.S. retirement income system 
faces major challenges as the transition 
to a much older society begins. The 
ratio of the elderly population (age 65 or 
over) to working-age adults (ages 20–64) 
will rise from 20 percent today to about 
35 percent by 2030 (Figure 1). Social 
Security, the backbone of the nation’s 
retirement income system, faces a long-
term shortfall equal to 2.02 percent of 
taxable payrolls when measured over 
the traditional 75-year planning horizon 
(Table 1). That deficit is significantly 
larger if we also consider the years 
beyond that horizon. 
Compounding the challenge is the 
fact that fewer employers sponsor 
traditional defined-benefit pension 
plans. This removes employer 
investment management, risk-bearing, 
and a significant amount of employer 
contributions from the retirement income 
system. In the now dominant 401(k) 
plans, workers assume the investment 
and mortality risks formerly borne by 
their employers; so far they have not 
accumulated the assets needed for a 
secure retirement. 
Our new book, Social Security and 
the Stock Market: How the Pursuit 
of Market Magic Shapes the System, 
is a contribution to the debate over 
how to restore financial balance to the 
Social Security program. It focuses on 
a surprising point of consensus in that 
contentious debate: a portion of the funds 
that pass through the program ought to 
be invested in equities. Policymakers 
from all political camps see investment 
in equities, with the higher expected 
returns they offer, as a way to minimize 
tax increases or retirement income 
cuts—the only other options for closing 
the financing shortfall. 
The 1994–1996 Social Security 
Advisory Council proposed three main 
approaches for using equities in the U.S. 
Social Security program: 1) invest a 
portion of trust fund assets in equities;  
2) use add-on individual accounts, which 
would top up the reduced benefits that 
could be financed by the payroll tax; and 
3) use carve-out individual accounts, 
funded by redirecting a portion of 
current payroll taxes in exchange for a 
further reduction of guaranteed social 
Our book focuses on a 
surprising point of consensus 
in the contentious debate on 
Social Security: a portion 
of the funds that pass through 
the program ought to  
be invested in equities.
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insurance benefits. But the council failed 
to reach a consensus on which method to 
recommend, and no action has since been 
taken. 
To help evaluate the nation’s options 
going forward, our book explores the 
experiences of three countries—the 
United Kingdom, Australia, and 
Canada—with retirement systems much 
like that of the United States that have 
introduced equities into their public 
pension system in each of the three ways 
proposed by the Advisory Council. 
Lessons from the U.K. Experience 
The United Kingdom reformed its 
system along the lines of the Advisory 
Council carve-out approach. It sharply 
cut its two social insurance pension 
programs, the Basic State Pension and the 
State Earnings Related Pension Scheme 
(SERPS), rather than schedule a sharp 
increase in taxes. The Basic State Pension 
fell from 25 percent of the average 
earnings in 1980 to 15 percent today, and 
is projected to be just 7 percent by the 
middle of the twenty-first century. The 
government even encouraged workers to 
“contract out” of SERPS by redirecting 
their payroll tax contributions to 
individual retirement savings accounts. 
One lesson from the British experience 
is that individual accounts can result in 
high administrative and regulatory costs, 
along with significant mismanagement 
and scandal.  Most U.S. carve-out 
proposals would improve on the British 
design by using the government to 
collect and administer accounts with 
small balances. But the cost of selling, 
administering, and regulating individual 
accounts, even well above the “small 
balance” threshold, is nevertheless high. 
The most important lesson from the 
U.K experience is that a broad take-up 
of the individual account option, with a 
resulting reduction in guaranteed benefits 
below the socially acceptable level of 
adequacy, could quickly lead to a major 
expansion of means-testing. The British 
elderly, on the whole, are now on the 
road to becoming a welfare-dependent 
population. To avoid this outcome, the 
British government is considering major 
reform of its retirement income system 
that would abandon the carve-out design. 
The goal of the U.K.’s carve-out 
approach was to reduce dependence 
on the state and increase reliance on 
individual initiative and private financial 
markets. However, retirement income 
systems emerged throughout the 
industrial world because people generally 
proved themselves incapable of preparing 
for their own old age. The British 
experience suggests that this original 
incapacity has not been overcome. Thus 
the outcome of sharp social insurance 
cutbacks and expanded privatization—in 
the United States as in Britain—is 
likely to be just the opposite of what its 
proponents desire.   
Lessons from the  
Australian Experience 
Australia reformed its retirement 
income system along the lines of the 
add-on individual account approach. 
Like the add-on proposal of the 
Social Security Advisory Council, the 
Australian Superannuation Guarantee 
program brought additional resources 




As a percent of
Taxable payrolls GDP
2006–2080 4.9a 2.02 0.7
2006–Infinity 13.4 3.7 1.3
a The $4.9 trillion includes $4.6 trillion, the difference between scheduled benefits and projected 
revenues, and $343 billion required to bring the trust fund to 100 percent of annual cost by the 

















Figure 1  U.S. Population Age 65+ as a Percentage of Population 20–64, 1950–2050
The British elderly, on 
the whole, are now on the road 
to becoming a welfare-
dependent population. To 
avoid this outcome, the British 
government is considering 
major reform of its retirement 
income system that would 
abandon the carve-out design.  
SOURCE: U.S. Social Security Administration (2006).
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to the retirement income system. 
Superannuation Guarantee contributions, 
at 9 percent of earnings, are far larger 
than add-on proposals in the United 
States. But the preexisting Australian 
public system was limited to the means-
tested Age Pension and had no earnings-
related component. 
Many Australians hoped that workers 
would accumulate enough assets in their 
Superannuation Guarantee accounts to 
return the Age Pension to its original 
safety net function. But Treasury projects 
that 75 percent of the elderly will collect 
Age Pension benefits even after the 
Superannuation Guarantee program 
matures, with even more collecting 
benefits at some point in their lives, 
and benefits for the average beneficiary 
only slightly reduced. For this reason, 
the Age Pension will remain the central 
component of the Australian retirement 
income system. 
A key lesson for the United States 
arises from the interaction between 
Australia’s Superannuation Guarantee 
individual account and its means-tested 
Age Pension programs. The retirement 
income generated by Superannuation 
Guarantee accounts, invested in equities, 
carries a good deal of risk. The risks are 
essentially identical to those in individual 
account employer plans, which are 
becoming as dominant in Australia as 
in the United States. The means-tested 
Age Pension plays an important role in 
offsetting a significant portion of this 
risk. Age Pension benefits rise for those 
who outlive their assets, invest poorly, 
or are in unlucky cohorts when it comes 
to investment returns. And it effectively 
funds those higher benefits by reducing 
benefits to those who do well or die 
young. 
But using the Age Pension means test 
to dampen the risks of holding equities in 
individual accounts has two dysfunctional 
effects. The first is the overinvestment 
in privileged assets, such as housing and 
consumer durables, that yield higher 
returns than alternative investments, such 
as stocks and bonds, only after netting out 
Age Pension reductions. Potentially far 
more serious is the incentive, created by 
the means test, for workers to retire early, 
cut back on savings, and spend down 
their assets prior to reaching old age to 
collect a higher Age Pension benefit. 
Lessons from the Canadian Experience 
Canada reformed its system along the 
lines of the trust fund approach. It set up 
the quasi-independent Canada Pension 
Plan Investment Board to oversee the 
investment of social insurance trust fund 
assets in equities. It also introduced 
a default mechanism that adjusts 
contribution and benefit levels to restore 
solvency over a 100-year period should 
market fluctuations, or other causes, push 
the plan out of balance. 
The Canadian experience shows that 
the cost of administering and regulating 
equity investments through a centrally 
managed trust fund is dramatically lower 
than through a myriad of individual 
accounts. Investment and mortality risks 
are also pooled far more effectively, in 
that the effect of market fluctuations 
and “excess” longevity on individual 
workers and retirees is dramatically less. 
This is especially important as workers 
in Canada, just as in the United States, 
are increasingly dependent on individual 
account employer retirement plans. The 
trust fund approach to pooling risk also 
avoids the moral hazard inherent in 
Australia’s means-tested approach. 
The major concern about investing 
social insurance trust fund assets in 
equities is the power it potentially puts in 
the hands of government. The Investment 
Board is free to invest trust fund assets in 
the full gamut of opportunities available 
to managers of employer defined-benefit 
pension plans. The Board could use this 
freedom to advance “socially desirable” 
purposes, which could undermine 
retirement income security and open the 
door to government interference in the 
economy. To guard against such threats, 
Canada adopted an elaborate process to 
minimize political influence in selecting 
the members of the Investment Board. 
It also mandated an extensive reporting 
process to make the workings of the 
Investment Board as transparent and open 
to public scrutiny as possible. Canadian 
observers generally agree that the 
Investment Board has thus far performed 
its duties in a professional manner, free of 
political influence.
Summary
The experience from these three 
countries seems to clearly indicate that 
a trust fund approach similar to the 
Canadian system would be the least 
problematic for the United States. The 
political stakes in placing such a large 
amount of wealth and corporate shares 
in government hands would be high. But 
the task of overseeing equity investments 
in Social Security would be simplified, 
and the likelihood of success significantly 
enhanced, if equities were added to the 
system through the trust fund approach. 
The task of governing the investment of 
the trust fund in a passive equity index 
is clearly less complex than the daunting 
challenge of overseeing and regulating 
equity investments in a great number of 
individual accounts.
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